The Mind Body Problem, By Thomas Nagel - 1352 Words

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, â€Å"is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.† Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as â€Å"perceptual experiences,† and Nagel describes as â€Å"something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to†¦show more content†¦He presents Mary, a scientist who focusses on colour processing in the brain, whilst having never left a black and white room, or experienced colour. Jackson’s argument rests on the premise that upon seeing colour she will learn something new, and given that she knew everything there was to know about the physical world, there must be epiphenomenal qualia which physicalism fails to explain. Brian Loar rejects Jackson’s conclusion on the basis that he has misinterpreted Mary’s learning. He suggests the knowledge she acquires is merely â€Å"new concepts of the same properties that she learned about before her release,† and not necessarily proof of ‘non physical’ knowledge. Arguably, Jackson’s aim is too rigid to add anything considerable to knowledge of the nature of consciousness. All it requires to be discredited is that one of its premises be disproven, which predisposes it to destruction in a way that Nagel’s more circumspect argument does not. Furthermore, how can we accept an argument as useful whose advocate later completely abandoned his view and reverted to a physicalist position? Nagel’s argument is harder to refute, owing to its lack of definitive conclusion. Nevertheless, its effectiveness remains debateable. It is interesting that he embraces the incomprehensibility ofShow MoreRelatedThe Mind-Body Problem Essay957 Words   |  4 PagesThe Mind-Body Problem The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as Renà © Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but differentRead MoreThomas Nagel - How Is It Like to Be a Bat? Essays888 Words   |  4 PagesThomas Nagel (1981) – How is it like to be a bat? Why does consciousness make the mind-body problem really intractable according to Thomas Nagel? 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In What Is It Like to Be a Bat, Thomas Nagel draws hisRead MoreThe Bats, the Blind, and the Butterflies Essay859 Words   |  4 Pagesback as Plato. Do humans have minds; a separate entity from the physical brain that allows us to think? Or is there only a brain, controlling everything including choices and emotions? Thoughts have no physical properties, so how is it that they reside in a physical container such as the brain? These questions all describe the â€Å"mind-body problem.† In the article, â€Å"What Is It Like to Be a Bat?† author Thomas Nagel provides his own view on the mind-body problem. He begins by stating that consciousnessRead MoreWhat is Physicalism?803 Words   |  3 Pagesphysicalist understanding of the mind and body problem is that both are not separate entities. The mind is just a part of the body: a physical entity. Thomas Nagel is a philosopher concerned with consciousness and the mind-body problem. 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Reduction has been a common method to attempt to link the relationship between the mind and theRead MoreWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat? by Thomas Nagel1343 Words   |  5 PagesIn â€Å"What is it like to be a bat?† Thomas Nagel argues that physicalism cannot possibly account for consciousness and quaila, or qualitative states. The objection in his article is target the flaws of both functionalism and physicalism with emphasis on the importance of consciousness and its subjec tive nature. In this paper, I will argue on Nagel’s argument but also focus on how a functionalist can respond to his objection. To explain what physicalism or functionalism stand for in philosophy, I will